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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1868
___________
RICHARD W. ILLES, SR.,
Appellant
v.
KEVIN DEPARLOS, Individually and in Official Capacity as Warden
of Lycoming County Prison; STEVEN BLANK, Individually and in
Official Capacity as Deputy Warden of Lycoming County Prison
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-01166)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 3, 2011
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 11, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Richard Illes, Sr., a prisoner incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in
Albion, Pennsylvania, appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary
judgment on his civil rights claims on the basis that he failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies. For the following reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Illes was incarcerated at the Lycoming County Prison (“LCP”) in 2003 while
awaiting trial on charges that he murdered his wife. He was transferred to state prison
after he was convicted and sentenced in 2004, but returned to LCP on three occasions in
2008 and 2009, in connection with hearings on his petition for post-conviction relief. On
those occasions, he was housed in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”), apparently
because he had attempted suicide at LCP in 2004 after being found guilty, which LCP
officials believed to have been a possible escape attempt. Illes filed this lawsuit against
LCP’s Warden and Deputy Warden, alleging that they retaliated against him and
otherwise violated his constitutional rights by placing him in the SMU. He also alleged
that the conditions in the SMU were unconstitutional and that he was denied access to the
courts.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Illes failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies and, alternatively, that Illes’s claims failed on their
merits. The Magistrate Judge recommended granting in part and denying in part the
motion, concluding that factual issues regarding the availability of LCP’s grievance
process precluded summary judgment on the defendants’ exhaustion defense. After
considering the parties’ objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report, the District Court
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granted summary judgment on the sole basis that Illes failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies. Illes timely appealed.
II.
The District Court possessed jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 &
1441(b). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of an order
granting summary judgment is plenary. Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.
2002). “A grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party has
established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d
265, 266 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted).
A prisoner may not bring a lawsuit based upon unconstitutional prison conditions
unless he first exhausts available administrative remedies. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). It is undisputed that Illes failed to comply with LCP’s grievance
policy; he filed one grievance with the Warden concerning his placement and conditions
in the SMU, but he never appealed that grievance to the Lycoming County Prison Board
as required for full exhaustion. The issue is instead whether LCP’s administrative
remedies were available to Illes.
Illes argues that LCP’s remedies were unavailable because he was not permitted to
possess an inmate handbook, which contained a description of the grievance process, or
writing implements while housed in the SMU. Furthermore, he contends that his requests
for a handbook were denied and that prison staff told him “there was no grievance
3

procedure at the prison” but that he could write to the Warden if he had concerns about
his placement.1 Indeed, he was only capable of filing the one grievance because a prison
staff member sat with him while he wrote it. The defendants admit that Illes was not
permitted to possess a handbook or writing implements while housed in the SMU.
However, they contend that LCP’s administrative remedies were available to Illes
because he had been given a handbook in 2003, when he first entered the prison, and had
access to that handbook until he was transferred away from LCP in 2004.
We have held that administrative remedies are unavailable when prison staff
misinforms a prisoner about the relevant administrative procedures. See Brown v. Croak,
312 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 2002). Furthermore, remedies that are not reasonably
communicated to inmates may be considered unavailable for exhaustion purposes. See
Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing “the importance of
ensuring that inmates have avenues for discovering the procedural rules governing their
grievances”); Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007) (“That which is
unknown and unknowable is unavailable”).
Here, Illes had no access to information about LCP’s grievance process while he
was incarcerated in the SMU in 2008 and 2009. Although administrative remedies are
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The relevant facts are supported by an affidavit that Illes submitted in support of his
opposition to the defendants’ first motion for summary judgment, which was denied
without prejudice due to outstanding discovery disputes. Illes’s opposition to the
defendants’ second motion for summary judgment – the one at issue in this appeal –
evinces his intent to incorporate that affidavit into the record even though he did not file
it a second time.
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generally considered available when an inmate has been given a copy of a handbook
describing those remedies, see Alexander v. Tippah Cnty., 351 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir.
2003), we believe it would be inappropriate to impute knowledge of the relevant
administrative procedures to Illes based on possession of a handbook four years before
the incident giving rise to his grievance occurred. Notably, Illes spent a significant
amount of time at another facility in the interim and there is no indication that he ever
used LCP’s administrative process in the past.2
More importantly, Illes contends that prison staff told him that there were no
grievance procedures and that, at most, he could write the Warden if he sought to contest
his placement in the SMU. That fact, which has not been refuted by the defendants – and
which, regardless, must be viewed in Illes’s favor under the applicable standard –
supports Illes’s contention that LCP’s administrative remedies were unavailable because
he was misinformed by prison staff about the existence and/or scope of those remedies.
See Brown, 312 F.3d at 112 (factual issue existed as to exhaustion when prisoner
contended that “he relied to his detriment on the defendants’ erroneous or misleading
instructions” concerning the applicable grievance process); see also Dillon, 596 F.3d at
268 (“When a prisoner has no means of verifying prison officials’ claims about the
administrative grievance process, incorrect statements by officials may indeed make
remedies unavailable.”). Thus, even if knowledge of LCP’s procedure could be inferred
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According to the defendants, the relevant procedures have not changed during those
four years.
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from Illes’s prior period of incarceration, which is highly doubtful, that knowledge would
have been superseded by prison officials’ erroneous statements to him about the
grievance process. Furthermore, Illes exhausted the only remedy he believed to be
available to him based on prison officials’ representations. Accordingly, the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion.3
The defendants urge us to affirm on the alternative basis that Illes’s claims fail on
their merits. Illes moved to quash that argument, which he characterizes as an untimely
cross-appeal. We will deny Illes’s motion because a party may argue for affirmance on
alternative grounds without filing a cross-appeal, provided that the same arguments were
raised before the District Court. See Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 283 n.2
(3d Cir. 2010). However, since the District Court never reached the merits of Illes’s
claims, we believe it would be preferable for the District Court to address them in the
first instance on remand.
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendants on the issue of exhaustion and remand for further
proceedings. Illes’s motion to have his appeal decided without oral argument is granted.
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The defendants suggest that Illes should have requested an LCP handbook and/or
attempted to appeal his grievance once he returned to state prison. However, if Illes was
told that there was no grievance procedure, it is unclear why he should have been
expected to utilize that procedure or track down information about it. Furthermore,
although the defendants contend that Illes never requested a handbook while in the SMU,
that factual dispute must be resolved in Illes’s favor at this stage of the litigation.
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